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Abstract
West African countries are ranked especially low in global corruption perception indexes. The health
sector is often singled out for particular concern given the role of corruption in hampering access to,
and utilization of health services, representing a major barrier to progress to universal health cover-
age and to achieving the health-related Sustainable Development Goals. The first step in tackling cor-
ruption systematically is to understand its scale and nature. We present a systematic review of litera-
ture that explores corruption involving front-line healthcare providers, their managers and other
stakeholders in health sectors in the five Anglophone West African (AWA) countries: Gambia, Ghana,
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, identifying motivators and drivers of corrupt practices and interven-
tions that have been adopted or proposed. Boolean operators were adopted to optimize search out-
puts and identify relevant studies. Both grey and published literature were identified from Research
Gate, Yahoo, Google Scholar, Google and PubMed, and reviewed and synthesized around key
domains, with 61 publications meeting our inclusion criteria. The top five most prevalent/frequently
reported corrupt practices were (1) absenteeism; (2) diversion of patients to private facilities; (3) in-
appropriate procurement; (4) informal payments; and (5) theft of drugs and supplies. Incentives for
corrupt practices and other manifestations of corruption in the AWA health sector were also high-
lighted, while poor working conditions and low wages fuel malpractice. Primary research on anti-
corruption strategies in health sectors in AWA remains scarce, with recommendations to curb corrupt
practices often drawn from personal views and experience rather that of rigorous studies. We argue
that a nuanced understanding of all types of corruption and their impacts is an important precondition
to designing viable contextually appropriate anti-corruption strategies. It is a particular challenge to
identify and tackle corruption in settings where formal rules are fluid or insufficiently enforced.
Keywords: Health sector, health sector corruption, African health systems, Anglophone West Africa, universal health coverage
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Introduction
Corruption is endemic in many low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), including those in Anglophone West African (AWA),
affecting all sectors but especially health (World Bank, 2015; World
Bank, n.d.). It undermines health service delivery, entrenching
inequalities in access and encouraging inappropriate care, sometimes
with lethal consequences (Dovlo, 2012; World Bank, 2015;
Akokuwebe and Adekanbi, 2017). It is a major barrier to achieving
the health-related Sustainable Development Goals, including univer-
sal health coverage. Yet despite its undoubted importance, solutions
have been elusive, in part because it is complex and takes place
away from public gaze (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Holeman
et al., 2016; Hadi, n.d.). Consequently, a first step in tackling cor-
ruption is to bring it into the light, revealing its myriad forms and
the factors that have allowed it to persist in the face of attempts to
combat it. Doing so will help policymakers to develop and evaluate
evidence-based responses.
Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as the abuse
of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International,
2019). de Sardan (2013) further posits that corruption is manifest in
the divergence between actual behaviours of employees and official
norms governing them. In many cases, health system actors diverge
from official regulations and norms, which may be constraining and
poorly designed, in part as a coping mechanism in poorly resourced
health systems. It can be argued that rule-breaking, non-compliant
practices that have neutral or even beneficial impacts on patient care
need to be delineated from harmful informal/illicit practices (corrup-
tion) (Khan et al., 2016). Thus, Vian (2008) describes health sector
corruption as rule-breaking practices abetted by front-line health
workers, facility managers and governmental authorities (see has
health system agents) that put health service users at high risk of not
receiving accessible or appropriate care. Vian (2008) not only
acknowledges that corrupt practices may be triggered by health ser-
vice users, but also describes how corruption occurs in circumstan-
ces when particular practices have evolved to become system-wide
norms with popular acceptance. This review thus explores the types
and drivers of corruption that not only breach rules and norms but
also (potentially or actually) harm access to care and health
outcomes.
Corruption in health sectors in AWA has been linked to many
adverse outcomes, including reduced efficiency of health systems
and increased mortality (Vian and Norberg, 2008; Adegboyega and
Abdulkareem, 2012; Onotai and Nwankwo, 2012; World Bank,
2015; Gaitonde et al., 2016; Mooketsane and Phirinyane, 2017).
The scale of the problem in AWA is apparent from corruption per-
ception indices published annually by TI. Countries in this sub-
region are consistently rated poorly. The 2018 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Ghana in 81st position out of 180
countries, with a score of 51% (where 100% is full transparency).
Liberia ranks 122nd, at 32%, followed by Gambia and Sierra
Leone, tied in 130th position, with 28%, while Nigeria lagged be-
hind in 148th position, with a score of 18%. In TI’s ratings, the
health sector is consistently reported as one of the most corrupt sec-
tors, in part reflecting the private nature of many of the interactions
between users and providers and the asymmetry of information
involved.
While there is widespread, often anecdotal, recognition that cor-
ruption in health sectors is common, there is much less information
on its nature and dynamics in individual countries. In this article, we
address this problem by reviewing systematically what is known
about corruption within health systems in AWA. The importance of
doing so is not in doubt, given the imperative of getting maximum
value from the limited resources provided for health in this sub-
region and the increasing demands for transparency imposed by the
development agencies that are so important in supporting health
services. Yet these efforts are constrained by the lack of evidence on
the types of corruption in the health sector, the forms that they take
and the drivers that sustain corrupt practices in the health sector.
Khan argued that a better understanding of the nuanced nature of
corruption can also facilitate the shift from historical, and largely
unsuccessful vertical, normative government-driven anti-corruption
measures that de-emphasize the involvement of those on the front-
line, such as health workers and facility managers (Khan, 2017).
Instances of vertical enforcement measures include policies to regu-
late drug distribution and sales, fire or penalize health workers,
adapt salary structure, financial audits by government-mandated
anti-corruption bodies, etc. Horizontal actions include, e.g. monitor-
ing of attendance registers by facility heads, sensitizing health
consumers to their rights, community monitoring by locally estab-
lished committees, monitoring internally generated revenue, etc.
Consequently, we seek to understand how health workers circum-
vent anti-corruption strategies, what can incentivize them to follow
the rules (horizontal approaches), and thereby to identify plausible
responses that can be implemented locally.
Our findings will inform health researchers, policymakers and
donors as they seek to understand how corruption affects health sys-
tem performance and help identify interventions that can combat
corruption in the health sector. This is an important given paucity of
evidence on how best to eliminate the factors that encourage and
sustain corruption.
Proposed anti-corruption measures included stringent sanctions
on doctors who accept kickbacks and bribes from pharmaceutical
industries, mechanisms to increase visibility of informal payments
and strict enforcement of existing rules in health facilities (Dabo
et al., 2014; Gaitonde et al., 2016; Mackey et al., 2016). However,
very little is known about whether and in what circumstances these
Key Messages
• Health sector corruption in Anglophone West Africa is judged prevalent, contributing to the region’s appalling ratings in
global corruption perception indexes.
• Recorded top corruption concerns marring efficiency of health systems in Anglophone West Africa are absenteeism,
diversion of patients to private facilities, inappropriate procurement, informal payments and theft of medical supplies.
• Frequently occurring drivers of these corruption concerns include weak value systems, normalization of inappropriate
practices, information asymmetry and poor staff welfare/working conditions.
• Interventions to curb recorded corruption concerns were largely recommended, which opens up the path for future
studies to empirically explore interventions that would be feasible.
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measures work. Thus, there is clear need to examine what evidence
does exist to inform context-specific anti-corruption strategies and
policies.
This article reviews and synthesizes knowledge on the nature
and scope of corruption in the health sector amongst health
workers who have been reported in published literature on AWA
countries. It identifies the types of corruption that exist in their
health sectors, examines the incentives that give rise to corruption,
inappropriate and ineffective care by front-line healthcare pro-
viders (those who interact with patients) and their managers and
suggests measures that might possibly reduce or eliminate these
incentives.
Methods
We conducted a systematic review of published material on corrup-
tion in health systems in the AWA countries, comprising Gambia,
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. All the AWA countries
are classified by the World Bank as LMICs. The search strategy
employed was as inclusive as possible, recognizing that an over-
restrictive approach could compromise our quest to achieve a full
understanding of the nature of this phenomenon. It used a series of
key search terms developed following extensive consultation within
the research team and applying appropriate Boolean operators.
The searches were conducted following adaptation to the fea-
tures of the databases, in PubMed, Researchgate, Hinari and Google
Scholar. Studies were included initially if they were: (1) published
between 2007 and 2017; (2) focused on corruption within AWA
countries; and (3) written in English or with an available English
translation. Each publication was examined independently by three
members of the team to determine duplication and relevance before
data extraction. Then, we categorized the different types of corrup-
tion; identified causes or processes involved; factors that facilitate
different forms of corruption; the effects of corruption; and
interventions that have been suggested or implemented. Given the
wide diversity of literature reviewed, some of which were expected
to be merely descriptive, it was inappropriate to undertake a formal
risk of bias assessment.
Conceptual frameworks
Three existing conceptualizations of corruption guided our review
and synthesis (see an overview in Table 1). The first, drawing on
work by Vian (2008), focuses on understanding how opportunities,
pressures on and rationalizations by key actors influence corruption.
Based on this, we identified areas of the health sector prone to
corruption, including provision of services by medical personnel,
human resources management, drug selection and use, procurement
of drugs and medical equipment, distribution and storage of drugs,
regulatory systems, budgeting and pricing. We also drew on another
actor-oriented conceptualization of health sector corruption, by
Gaitonde et al. (2016), emphasizing actions and inactions of stake-
holders within the health system as key to sustaining corruption
(Table 2).
The second conceptualization, which underpins the Vian and
Norberg (2008), argues that corruption thrives in health systems be-
cause of the nature of relationships among stakeholders in the sys-
tem. These can involve exchanges, practical gains and social norms.
Vian (2008) identified three groups of agents who can encourage
corruption in the health sector: government agents who adopt cor-
rupt practices in response to failings in the health system; pressured
clients who would do anything to get quicker and better quality
health services; and health workers/managers who struggle with
competing pressures from their families and others. Vian also notes
how social norms can sustain corruption in the health sector, with
inappropriate practices being tolerated and eventually normalized.
Thirdly, de Sardan (2013) theorizes corruption as informal
behaviours that contradict official norms, with consequences mostly
Table 1 Conceptualizations of corruption informing the study
S/no. Author(s) Basic assumption Explanation
1 Vian (2008) and
Gaitonde et al. (2016)
Corruption in the health sector is caused and sus-
tained by ‘key stakeholders who are either
opportunists, pressured, or good at rationalizing’
supposed corrupt practices as norms. [vertical
approaches/regulation solutions]
The consequence of actions and inactions of stakeholders
in the health sector has severely corrupted the system,
particularly in the area of selection, procurement and
distribution of drugs, health financing and human capital
management.
2 Vian and Norberg (2008) ‘Relationships among stakeholders’ (based on social
norms, pragmatic objectives or other reciprocal
relationships) in the health sector form a strong
conduit for corruption. [vertical approaches/
regulation solutions]
Corruption happens when government agents engage
inappropriate practices because the health system is
poorly governed; clients are deprived of healthcare which
naturally should be their rights, and so are pressured to
pay bribes or take to other ill processes in seeking health
services. Whereas, health workers/managers are forced to
in same failing system, preferentially cater for those they
share social ties with.
3 de Sardan (2013) and
Gaal and McKee
(2004)
Behaviours of stakeholders in the health sector that
deviate from ethics and principles ‘are mostly in-
formal’ and often at the junction of what is consid-
ered ‘the usual practice’ and corruption. Gaal and
McKee further argue that consumers and pro-
viders, instead of seeking an official recourse to
get a service (‘voice’), or seeking care outside the
public sector (‘exit’), resort to informal means to
achieving their objectives (giving an informal
payment or gift) within the limits of the existing
system (informal exit or ‘inxit’). [horizontal
approaches/collective action solutions]
Informal behaviours of health sector stakeholders cause
corruption to thrive, and affect health service users and
workers who are less powerful. The less powerful groups
can challenge these informal behaviours if given a voice.
If not, they can disengage from the process. Thus, the
scaling up the voice of less powerful groups affected
by such informal behaviours can be a basis for anti-
corruption activities.
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for the less powerful or disadvantaged groups. He believes that in-
formal activities amount to rule breaking, and so portend risks to
both health workers and service consumers who are less powerful.
This idea is also captured in Gaal and McKee’s (2004) interpretation
of Hirschman’s theory of consumer behaviour where health service
users engage in informal and illicit behaviours (where required) in
order to achieve their objectives within a system that is under
resourced and where legitimate claims are not respected (informal
exit or ‘inxit’). These conceptualizations suggest that effective action
would involve giving less powerful groups voice to transform the
current system.
The three conceptualizations differ in terms of their emphasis on
vertical approaches (better regulations, sanctions and structured
incentives) vs. horizontal approaches (involving flexible incentives
and collective action solutions). A summary is presented in Table 1.
Findings
In total, 283 published, unpublished and grey literature reports were
retrieved initially from the primary searches. After initial screening,
61 were found to match the inclusion criteria and were retained and
reviewed. The flow chart describing this process is shown in
Figure 1. The largest single category comprised academic journal
articles (n¼29). Other sources included technical reports from civil
society organizations, students’ projects, news articles and book
chapters.
None of the publications included were on Gambia or Liberia.
Most were published from 2010 onwards. The studies employed di-
verse methodological approaches, using a range of quantitative and
qualitative methods.
We first identify the causes of corruption in the health sector, to
enable an understanding of motivations for different types of cor-
rupt practices in the health sector and the effects each could have on
health systems in the region. We then discuss ways to curb these
practices. The prevalence of different corrupt practices in the health
sector, agencies that reinforce them, dimensions they take and
drivers/causes are synthesized in Table 3, alongside corresponding
interventions.
Drivers of corruption
Several characteristics of health systems in the region facilitate cor-
rupt practices. One is the role of direct payments, in cash or in kind
for in-health-related transactions (Onwujekwe et al., 2010;
Kamorudeen and Bidemi, 2012; Onotai and Nwankwo, 2012;
Onah and Govender, 2014; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016; Saka et al.,
2016; Akokuwebe and Adekanbi, 2017; Hoffman and Patel, 2017).
In-kind payments are more common in rural areas, where poverty
persists and patients or their relatives may do menial jobs for health
workers (Onah and Govender, 2014). In addition, the exclusion of
many people from insurance schemes increases the frequency of out-
Table 2 Types, interactions and mechanisms of corruption in health system
Types of behaviour Types of interactions
With government regulators With payers With patients
Between government regulators
and suppliers, payers or
providers
Between payers and
suppliers
Between payers and providers Between suppliers,
providers and patients
Theft (taking resour-
ces without
permission or right)
Collusion in embezzlement
(fraudulent appropriation of
resources) by government
regulators
Embezzlement by
suppliers
Embezzlement by managers in
provider organizations
Sale of drugs or supplies
that were supposed
to be free by health
workers
Not delivering on a
contract by suppliers
Not delivering on a contract by
provider organizations
Pilfering of supplies by health
workers
Private use of public facilities and
equipment by health workers
Bribes (giving or tak-
ing money or some-
thing else of value
to influence a deci-
sion for
private gain)
Bribes to obtain regulatory deci-
sions benefiting suppliers,
payers or providers
(including state capture)
Bribes or kickbacks to
obtain contracts
benefiting suppliers
Bribes or kickbacks to obtain con-
tracts benefiting providers
Informal payments by
patients to doctors to
obtain access or quality
Bribes to obtain accreditation,
certification, approval
(e.g. drug registration), or
inspection results
Fee-splitting by specialists to refer-
ring health workers to induce
referrals
Policy decisions to further public
officials’ or politicians’ careers
Misinformation
(falsifying informa-
tion for private
gain)
False reporting by suppliers,
payers or providers to
government regulators
Falsifying information
to obtain contracts
benefiting suppliers
False insurance claims Falsification of credentials
by health workers
Prescription fraud (bogus or forged
prescriptions to bill payers)
Supplier-induced or sup-
plier-reduced demand
Absenteeism (spending less time
than contracted to deliver care)
Misleading promotion
of drugs/products to
patients
Misleading drug promotion to pre-
scribers, including pseudo-trials
used to market drugs
Source: Gaitonde et al. (2016).
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of-pocket payments, which can easily be linked to demands for extra
informal contributions (Aregbesola, 2016).
A second is the lack of systems of patient rights (Hussmann,
2010) but, even when they exist, patients may be unaware of their
rights and of the legal procedures for redress (Vian, 2008). Thus,
there are few formal channels for patients to challenge health work-
ers (Onwujekwe et al., 2010; Ojiaku, 2014; Hoffman and Patel,
2017).
A third is the widespread shortage of many of the inputs to
health systems. For instance, when medical consumables are in short
supply, health workers felt justified in overcharging patients who
are in dire need of them (Akokuwebe and Adekanbi, 2017).
Physicians are often absent from public health facilities, reflecting
low wages and irregular payment of salaries (Onwujekwe et al.,
2010; Ojiaku, 2014; Hoffman and Patel, 2017). Many are involved
in dual practice, seen as contributing to widespread absenteeism
(Kamorudeen and Bidemi, 2012; Chimezie, 2015). Physicians often
rationalize dual practice as a means to improve their low earnings
and public hospitals may tolerate this practice because it avoids
pressure to increase salaries (Vian, 2008; Aregbesola, 2016). Even
when health workers employed in the public sector are banned from
engaging in private practice during work hours, some continue to do
so (Aregbesola, 2016). Kamorudeen and Bidemi (2012) identified a
widespread view among patients that a relationship with health
workers secured through bribery was necessary, in these circumstan-
ces, to obtain quick, acceptable quality healthcare. Finally, corrupt
behaviours are facilitated by poor documentation and weak systems
of oversight and governance (Vian, 2008; Stakeholder Democracy
Network, 2013).
Although we have focused our review on horizontal processes
and relationships that are most amenable to local action, it is im-
portant to note that action is often constrained by the wider political
aspects of corruption. Corrupt practices were frequently attributed
to the nature of the relationships between officials and politicians.
Some government practices encourage corruption, including exploit-
ation of healthcare facilities for political purposes (Akpomuvie,
2010), as when they are situated in locations that offer political ben-
efits to those making the decisions rather than meeting the health
needs of the population. Inadequate health-budget-led supply
failures and low pay also creates conditions in which various forms
of corruption can flourish (Agbenorku, 2012; Vian and Norberg,
2008). These various forms are further discussed below.
Types/forms of corruption in the health sector
Five main types of corruption were identified. They are: (1) bribery/
informal payments to health providers; (2) absenteeism and late ar-
rival to work; (3) theft and diversion of drugs and other supplies/
equipment from the public to private facilities; (4) inappropriate
procurement of medical consumables and equipment; (5) diversion
of patients from public facilities to health workers’ private facilities
and vice versa. These often co-existed. To illustrate the different
types of corruption, Table 4 categorizes them by country, whereas
Table 5 summarizes the processes involved in each type of corrup-
tion and interventions that have been proposed to combat them. We
now discuss each in turn.
Informal payments (bribery)
The terms bribery and informal payments are often used inter-
changeably in the papers included in the review, and research else-
where has shown how the various manifestations are often difficult
to differentiate, given the challenges of ascertaining the motivation
driving the transaction (Gaal and McKee, 2005). However, ‘bribery’
is more often used to refer to offering money or gifts to hasten serv-
ices or obtain a service while ‘informal payments’ more often refer
to paying fees for supposedly free services or paying in kind for
health services (Azuh, 2012; Saka et al., 2016).
There were many reports of informal payments or bribes being
paid by service users to health workers in cash and/or kind (Garuba
et al., 2009; Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2013; Saka et al.,
2016; Turay, 2016). They appeared to be more common in remote
areas, disproportionately affecting the poor and other vulnerable
groups. Bribes were often paid to jump a queue or receive preferen-
tial and better quality care, whereas health workers sometimes
demanded fees for supposedly free health services (Stakeholder
Democracy Network, 2013; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016). de
Sardan (2013) rationalized high prevalence of informal payments in
remote areas as due to poverty and low education of many rural
dwellers, who may have low expectations of services and have little
or no power or opportunity to speak out.
The use of bribes to expedite treatment was often considered as
normal. Thus, Saka et al. (2016) argued that informal payments and
bribery that help patients to avoid bureaucratic bottlenecks rapidly
become normalized by patients. They also argued that, once normal-
ized, patients offer unsolicited bribes. Other cases where bribes were
reported include doctors refusing to see patients except when a bribe
is paid; nurses not monitoring babies until they receive inappropri-
ate payments from their mothers; and staff imposing charges for
supposedly free items and interventions (Chimezie, 2015; Turay,
2016).
While it is often argued that poor pay explains demands for
bribes by health workers, normalization of bribery by patients them-
selves calls for explanation. We consider two major antecedents to
normalization of bribery in poor regions of Nigeria. First, most sec-
tors in these regions, including policing, power, education and
sports, are characterized by arbitrary bribery (Enakhimion, 2011).
Accounts are widespread in the media on normalization of the phe-
nomenon in the health sector and throughout society (Enakhimion,
2011; Transparency International, 2017). Second, absence of con-
sumer protection laws removes a potential constraint on health
A total of 283 full text articles 
published between 2007 and 
2017 were assessed for 
relevance eligibility
201 identified unique articles 
were scrutinized
61 full text articles were reviewed for 
focus and coverage of Anglophone 
West African countries 
80 articles were 
excluded for 
irrelevance and 
duplication
A total of 134 articles 
were excluded after 
screening titles and 
abstracts for relevance 
Figure 1 Flow chart showing detailed article extraction and evaluation
method.
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workers acting inconsiderately to patients (Hoffman and Patel,
2017). This lack of protection leaves health service users at the
mercy of healthcare providers. Third, many people are uninsured
and payment systems are not automated (Aregbesola, 2016), so
transactions involve cash that can more easily be diverted than if
electronic systems were used.
Absenteeism
Absenteeism was a frequently cited form of corruption, especially
when health workers are absent to serve personal interests, that
going contrary to official norms prescribed for employee behaviour
(Vian, 2008; UNDP, 2011; Kamorudeen and Bidemi, 2012; de
Sardan, 2013; Maduke, 2013; Chimezie, 2015; Mackey et al., 2016,
etc.). It manifests in different forms, including health workers failing
to turn up for work, turning up late, being at work but not working
and leaving the workplace before closing hours (Diestel et al.,
2014). The term ‘absenteeism’ also covers health workers employed
in public facilities attending to patients in their private facilities dur-
ing official hours, or where these public employed health workers
engage in contract and consultancy jobs at the expense of their pri-
mary employment. This has created situations in which some health
workers perform tasks outside the scope of their licenses or expertise
(Chimezie, 2015).
There are several factors at work, including weak systems of
oversight and sanctions, and protection of some individuals with
political or other connections. It is also necessary to consider the
association with problems that limit the ability of staff to work ef-
fectively in public facilities, including a lack of basic infrastructure
and poor transport links (UNDP, 2011; Stakeholder Democracy
Network, 2013; Chimezie, 2015).
Measures suggested to curb absenteeism include strict sanctions,
rewards linked to being present and improved wages, thereby
reducing the perceived need for additional income (Vian and
Norberg, 2008). However, there is little evidence of holistic inter-
ventions against absenteeism of health workers in AWA countries
addressing the spectrum of drivers highlighted above.
Theft/diversion of drugs, medical supplies and other public
resources
In many situations, it is relatively easy for health workers to divert
medical supplies to private facilities or for sale for private gain (Vian
and Norberg, 2008; UNDP, 2011; Maduke, 2013; Mackey et al.,
2016; Saka et al., 2016; Akokuwebe and Adekanbi, 2017). Some
reports described health workers retaining high-quality hospital
supplies for their own use whereas selling sub-standard products to
clients, or withholding ‘free’ hospital supplies from clients but sell-
ing them from their own supplies. Sometimes doctors use public
facilities to provide services to their private clients, to the detriment
of their public ones (Akinbajo, 2012; Chimezie, 2015). The absence
or weak enforcement of consumer protection laws in most AWA
countries enables this type of corruption to thrive, as no alarm is
raised, and no questions are asked (de Sardan, 2013).
Sub-optimal procurement of drugs and other medical equipment
Procurement of medical consumables and equipment is especially
susceptible to corruption (Amnesty International, 2011; UNDP,
2011; Kamorudeen and Bidemi, 2012; Maduke, 2013). However,
unlike many of the other forms of corruption that involve individual
interactions between health care staff and patients in private,
this often involves a conspiracy among multiple actors. Thus, store-
keepers identify items to be procured, hospital managers approve
the need for such supplies and high-ranking officials in ministries or
health authorities approve the release or disbursement of funds.
These processes are frequently facilitated by pharmaceutical vendors
who provide incentives to health administrators and managers to
secure procurement contracts, and kickbacks to health workers,
motivating them to prescribing and dispensing their branded
pharmaceuticals (Vian, 2008). There were also reports of managers
bribing officials in health ministries, who send them medical con-
sumables and equipment for sale in their facilities, with the cost of
the bribes then reclaimed by charging patients for some of the serv-
ices that should be free. The underlying reason often relates to the
absence of consumer protection mechanisms.
Diversion of patients
Doctors may divert patients from public to private health facilities
even when public facilities can deliver treatment (Vian and Norberg,
2008). They then charge them for private services. The patients are
convinced by the doctors that this improves quality of care
(Maduke, 2013). In other cases, they divert their private patients to
public facilities where they are treated using government owned
equipment and materials, but charged as private patients (Vian and
Norberg, 2008; Saka et al., 2016). It is often assumed that this
reflects doctors’ poor pay but less frequently often discussed reasons
include a high patient–doctor ratio and the relative immunity of doc-
tors from sanctions. Given the shortage of doctors in these countries,
they are often seen as doing the public system a favour simply by
coming to work at all. Doctors play leading roles in health systems
in this region, often in a revolving door linking periods in clinical
practice with official roles, providing a disincentive to take definitive
action.
Other types/forms of corruption
Another example of corruption, less frequently reported, relates to
employment practices. These include paying bribes to be employed,
recruiting staff based on relationships with politically connected
persons or relatives/kinsmen; employing ‘ghost workers’ to obtain
their wages, renting public facilities for private gain, distributing
counterfeit medical consumables, nepotism/favouritism (Maduke,
2013), document forgery, corruption associated with payments for
staff promotion, training and deployment; and underpayment of
medical staff while diverting resources. Mooketsane and Phirinyane
(2017) pointed to inadequate governance, mismanagement and mis-
appropriation of funds as both drivers and manifestations of corrupt
practices in the health sector. Agbenorku (2012) described fraud
and forgery related to the auditing processes in the Ghanaian
National Health Insurance Scheme, with damaging consequences
for patients.
Effects of corruption
Gaitonde et al. (2016) summarized the effects of corruption at
different levels including general effects, effects on the healthcare
system and effects on health outcomes. Health sector corruption has
been linked to several adverse health outcomes. Infant and child
mortality are estimated to be almost twice as high in countries with
high corruption indices than in countries where they are low. Others
include inadequate immunization rates, delays in treatments, failure
to treat patients, reduced use of public health clinics, reduced satis-
faction with care and increased waiting times (Vian and Norberg,
2008; Akpomuvie, 2010; Adegboyega and Abdulkareem, 2012;
Agbenorku, 2012; Onotai and Nwankwo, 2012; World Bank, 2015;
Turay, 2016). In addition, corruption in the health sector has been
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blamed for increases in the cost of services, poor staff development,
shortages of medical consumables and lack of availability and qual-
ity of health service equipment (Akinbajo, 2012; Azuh, 2012).
However, although many of these associations are intuitive, few
have been subjected to detailed analysis.
Research on how the public view corruption points to a phenom-
enon seen as being created and perpetuated by health workers,
patients and government agents (Azuh, 2012; Maduke, 2013;
Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2013; Hoffman and Patel, 2017).
Vian (2008) mentioned patients normalizing corrupt practices.
However, such normalization did not dispel the negative feelings
patients expressed towards the corrupt act as they apportion blames
to health workers (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2013;
Hoffman and Patel, 2017). For instance, patients typically blamed
doctors for absenteeism and the hospital management for the gener-
ally poor care they receive when they visit the facility (Stakeholder
Democracy Network, 2013). Thus, while some of the root causes
and facilitators of corruption lie in how the government fails health
workers, patients are much more liable to hold front-line health
workers and their managers accountable.
Measures to reduce corruption in the health sector
Some of the previously mentioned drivers of corruption in the health
sector, such as poor pay of health workers, poor working condi-
tions, a lack of electronic systems for handling money, absence of
consumer protection, poor health infrastructure, weak application
of rules and deviant social norms should feature as pointers to rem-
edies. However, most recommendations rely on theory rather than
empirical evidence. For example, Tormusa and Idom (2016) advo-
cate whistleblowing mechanisms to facilitate reporting of miscon-
duct and corrupt practices. Others advocate establishing fraud
control units, internal audits, surveillance systems, attitudinal train-
ing, transparent detection and prosecution measures, institutionaliz-
ing formal Public–Private Partnership (PPP) models, improved
incentives, public sensitization, and Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) for monitoring procurement
(Vian, 2008; Maduke, 2013; Turay, 2016; Hanna et al., 2011).
Clearly, the responses should be tailored to the type of corrup-
tion. Thus, Mackey et al. (2016) advocate community monitoring,
enforcement of ethical principles and performance bonuses as ways
to curb absenteeism. Making patients aware of official prices of
services and consumables, improving work incentives for healthcare
workers and de-emphasizing the belief that giving bribes is a norm
in healthcare facilities have been suggested as viable means of cur-
tailing informal payments and bribery (Onwujekwe et al., 2010;
Maduke, 2013; Agbenorku, 2016; Tormusa and Idom, 2016;
Hoffman and Patel, 2017; Mitchell, 2017). Ojiaku (2014) suggested
enhanced control mechanisms as a way to tackle fraudulent procure-
ment. Electronic money transfer has been proposed as a way of
reducing diversion of co-payments (Vian, 2008; UNDP, 2011; The
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013; Gaitonde
et al., 2016; Holeman et al., 2016).
Interventions proposed to reduce theft include attitudinal train-
ing for health workers, regular monitoring of stores, store records,
and management procedures, improved employment practices, and
better work incentives and remuneration of health workers (Garuba
et al., 2009; Uzochukwu et al., 2011; Akokuwebe and Adekanbi,
2017; Azuh, 2012; Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2013;
Maduke, 2013; Chimezie, 2015). Electronic procurement systems
have been proposed to increase transparency (Onwujekwe et al.,
2010; UNDP, 2011; Maduke, 2013; The Association of Chartered
Certified Accountants, 2013). Adequate and appropriate staffing,
surveillance of stores, use of security services and other agencies
(multi-stakeholder partnership), timely and frequent reviews of fi-
nancial records, have been proposed as promoting corruption-free
processes more generally (Human Right Watch, 2007; Vian and
Norberg, 2008; Onwujekwe et al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2011;
UNDP, 2011; Maduke, 2013; The Association of Chartered
Certified Accountants, 2013; Holeman et al., 2016).
Unfortunately, few of these proposals are supported by actual
evidence of effectiveness. An exception is an ICT-based intervention
to monitor payments for health services in Ghana, reducing fraudu-
lent practices (Vian and Norberg, 2008; The Association of
Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013). The Ghanaian example
may not, however, be easily transferable to other settings. Ghana
stands out in Africa for its investment in information technology.
The World ICT Development Index rates Ghana in 116th position,
with Nigeria and Gambia at 143 and 144 positions, respectively,
while Liberia and Sierra Leone were not listed (ITU Data, 2017).
Ghana is seventh in Africa’s ICT development index, with none of
the other AWA countries in the top 10 (IT News Africa, 2017).
Another evidence-based approach to combatting corruption is pub-
lic sensitization, which raised awareness among Sierra Leonean
patients that they had a right to refuse to give bribes (Pay No Bribe
n.d.; Anti-Corruption Commission, 2014). These measures offer
promise because of their scope for local implementation without the
need to obtain consent from higher authorities in the hierarchy or to
navigate complex processes.
Discussion
The growth in the literature on corruption in AWA since 2010 is an
indication of its increasing relevance to the region and globally.
Once taken for granted, corruption, its causes, and ways to address
it, are now attracting considerable attention from researchers and
policymakers. This likely reflects growing recognition of the role
that corruption plays in impeding progress towards development
targets, such as the Millennium Development Goals and now the
Sustainable Development Goals, coupled with greater visibility,
brought about in part by the publication of corruption perception
indices. It is especially high on the agenda in this sub-region now,
given poor performance on transparency indices that has focused at-
tention on how weak systems of governance impede health system
strengthening.
This review seeks to narrow the gap between evidence on the
scale and nature of corruption in this region and action. The
adopted conceptualizations (Gaal and McKee, 2004; Vian and
Norberg, 2008; Vian, 2008; de Sardan, 2013; Gaitonde et al., 2016)
offered basis for structuring and interpreting our findings with key
explanations on what factors sustain different forms of corruption
in the health sector, and what approaches may offer a promise in be-
ginning to address them. However, the review has a number of limi-
tations. Most obviously, it is dependent on what has been written
about a topic that is almost always hidden and, in many cases, ac-
tively concealed from public view. As it threatens vested interests,
some with substantial power locally and nationally, it is especially
difficult to research. In fact, much of what is known about corrup-
tion generally, and not only in the health sector, has come from in-
vestigative journalism rather than academic research. Although
beyond the scope of this review, this raises questions for the health
systems research community, including methods that can be used
and the challenge of reconciling them with conventional principles
of research ethics, based on informed consent by the subjects of the
research. This is obviously problematic when the goal of the
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research is to expose unethical and, in many cases, criminal activity.
Added to this is the potential threat to the safety of researchers.
This review is only a first step in addressing a complex area,
which our adopted frameworks (Vian and Norberg, 2008; Vian,
2008; Gaitonde et al., 2016) describe as involving powerful actors,
social norms, social ties and sensitive areas of health system, that
seem difficult to study and tackle. Nevertheless, we begin by provid-
ing an understanding of what corruption is in the AWA context. We
were able to create a typology of corruption in the health sector and,
even though many types of corruption coincide, it seems likely that
there will be a need to combine generic measures related to function-
ing of institutions and adequacy of funding with measures that are
specific to the different types of corruption that we identify.
Examples include electronic systems to tackle absenteeism, as well
as theft and procurement fraud, and public information and aware-
ness raising programmes to challenge normative assumptions about
bribery. The issue of public enlightenment is in line with the idea for
addressing corruption by giving voice to the weak (Gaal and
McKee, 2004) and beginning to challenge informal behaviours that
contravene ethical conduct in the health sector (de Sardan, 2013).
Further, it was not possible to derive a quantitative measure of
the scale of corruption in the health sector in AWA but it was clear
that it is widespread and takes many forms (Vian, 2008). We were
able to identify different types and forms of corrupt practices; their
drivers, and the consequences of corruption for the lives of service
users in the region. The common types of corruption identified from
the reviewed studies were bribery, informal payments, absenteeism,
theft/diversion of medical supplies and patients, and procurement
frauds. However, other corrupt practices, such as document forgery,
employment irregularities, corruption in staff training, staff deploy-
ment, politically motivated distribution of health facilities and
underpayment of medical staff, were also identified.
While different types of corruption identified have a common
objective, which is the acquisition of private gain at public expense,
the factors that predispose to them vary greatly. These predisposing
factors involve a wide variety of people, including health workers,
health managers and service users, operating within a system that
frequently creates incentives for corrupt behaviour (Hoffman and
Patel, 2017). This was based on the work of Gaitonde et al. (2016)
who believed that poor health system governance is a conduit for
corruption to happen unchecked, as well as the Global Corruption
Report (2006) and Vian (2008) who argued that collective under-
standing and inactions among stakeholders in the health sector sus-
tain corrupt practices. Thus, the normative perception of bribery
and informal payments by health consumers, dual practice, poor
pay and welfare for health staff, service provider–service user power
differentials, cash payments, low public awareness levels, scanty
monitoring and evaluation processes, and an absence of a procure-
ment procedures, were all identified in reviewed studies as key driv-
ers of corruption in the region. Underlying them, however, is weak
health system governance, often identified as the root cause of the
endemic nature of corruption in AWA (Gaitonde et al., 2016), with
corruption often considered the norm by government agents, clients
and health workers, leaving very little room for change (Vian and
Norberg, 2008; Vian, 2008). However, as argued by Khan and cor-
roborating the findings of this review, there may be also a need to
depart from the normative government-driven anti-corruption meas-
ures, and shift the focus to addressing the behaviours and interests
of front-line health workers and facility managers, while placing
them in the context of local political structures (Khan, 2017). The
deep-seated problems of weak governance combined with poor
incentives for health systems actors to change the status-quo means
that there is little evidence to support particular anti-corruption
interventions, consistent with the systematic review by Gaitonde
et al. (2016).
By systematically describing the nature of corruption in health
sectors in AWA, we hope to raise it on the national and global polit-
ical agenda and encourage governments and non-governmental
organizations—in the region and beyond—to develop interventions
that can tackle the different types of corruption that we have
described.
Ethical approval. It is a systematic review, no human subject
was used.
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